Natural Resources, Tourism and Community Livelihoods in Southern Africa
Challenges of Sustainable Development

Edited by
Moren T. Stone, Monkgogi Lenao
and Naomi Moswete
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Contributors

**Brian Child** received a BSc (Hons) in Agricultural Economics from the University of Zimbabwe and a DPhil from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

**James Malitoni Chilembwe** is reading towards a PhD in Tourism Management at Glasgow Caledonian University (GCU), Scotland, UK.

**Felicite A Fairer-Wessels** is a senior lecturer at the Department of Marketing Management, Division of Tourism Management, University of Pretoria, South Africa.

**Jennifer M. Fitchett** is a senior lecturer at the School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.

**Hesekia Garekae** holds an MPhil in Natural Resource Management from Okavango Research Institute, University of Botswana, with a bias towards forests, livelihoods and governance. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate with the Department of Environmental Science, Rhodes University, South Africa.

**Bongani Glorious Gumbo** is a senior lecturer in the Department of History, University of Botswana.

**Wame Lucretia Hambira** is Senior Research Scholar with the Okavango Research Institute of the University of Botswana.

**Paul Hebinck** is Associate Professor in the Sociology of Development and Change group at Wageningen University, The Netherlands, and Adjunct Professor at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa.

**Jona Heita** holds an MA Degree in Culture and Environment in Africa from the University of Cologne, Germany. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Geography.

**Gijsbert Hoogendoorn** is Associate Professor at the Department of Geography, Environmental Management and Energy Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
Richard Dimba Kiaka is a post-doctoral researcher with the LINGS project (Local Institutions in Global Societies) at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Hamburg, Germany.

Mary-Ellen Kimaro is Lecturer of Tourism Studies in the Department of Geography, History and Environmental Studies at the University of Namibia.

Monkgogi Lenao is a senior lecturer in the Department of Tourism and Hospitality at the University of Botswana.

Joyce Lepetu is a senior lecturer at Botswana University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (BUAN). She has a PhD in Forest Sciences (2007), University of Florida, USA.

Rodgers Lubilo is a PhD holder in Development Sociology from Wageningen University, Netherlands. He is currently heading the North Luangwa Ecosystem Project, Zambia, for the Frankfurt Zoological Society.

Lesego Mackenzie is a lecturer in the Department of Environmental Science at the University of Botswana.

Kevin Mearns works at University of South Africa, Department of Environmental Sciences, College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, Florida Campus, South Africa.

Castro Milimo is a BSc holder in Wildlife Management, Department of Zoology and Aquatic Sciences, School of Natural Resources, The Copperbelt University, Kitwe, Zambia.

Gagoitseope Mmopelwa is Associate Professor of Environment and Development at the University of Botswana.

Patricia Kefilwe Mogomotsi is Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator of Training at the Okavango Research Institute, Botswana.

Naomi Moswete (PhD) is Senior Lecturer of Human Geography and Tourism Science at the University of Botswana.

Regis Musavengane has a PhD in Geography and Environmental Studies from the Witwatersrand University, Geography, Archeology and Environmental Studies School. He currently holds a Post-Doctorate Research Fellow at School of Tourism and Hospitality in the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Jones Mudimu Muzirambi is a PhD Alumni of the University of South Africa, as well as an Educator/Researcher in Mpumalanga Department of Education, Republic of South Africa.

Ngawo Namukonde is a lecturer in the Department of Zoology and Aquatic Sciences, School of Natural Resources, Copperbelt University, Zambia.
Contributors

Cleopas Njerekai is a final year PhD student with the Midlands State University in Zimbabwe and is also a lecturer in the Department of Tourism at the same university.

Gyan P. Nyaupane is Professor and Graduate Program Director at Arizona State University (ASU), Tempe, Arizona, USA.

Vincent R. Nyirenda is a senior lecturer under the Department of Zoology and Aquatic Sciences, School of Natural Resources, Copperbelt University, Zambia.

Jarkko Saarinen is Professor of Geography at the University of Oulu, Finland and School of Tourism and Hospitality, and University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Andrea Saayman is Professor of Economics and a researcher in the research unit: Tourism Research in Economics, Environments and Society (TREES) at North-West University, South Africa.

Melville Saayman is Professor in Tourism Management and Director of the Research Unit: Tourism Research in Economics, Environments and Society (TREES) at North-West University, South Africa.

R.V. Sannassee is a professor in the Department of Finance at the University of Mauritius, Mauritius.

Boopen Seetanah is Associate Professor in Economics and Finance and the Faculty Research Advisor at the Faculty of Law and Management of the University of Mauritius, Mauritius.

Lesego S. Stone is a research scholar at the Okavango Research Institute in the University of Botswana.

Moren T. Stone is Senior Lecturer of Environmental Science and Tourism at the University of Botswana.

Brijesh Thapa is a US Fulbright Senior Specialist and Professor in the Department of Tourism, Recreation and Sport Management at the University of Florida, USA.

Dallen J. Timothy is Professor of Community Resources and Development at Arizona State University and Senior Sustainability Scientist at the Julie Ann Wrigley Global Institute of Sustainability, USA.
6  Navigating community conservancies and institutional complexities in Namibia

Paul Hebinck, Richard Dimba Kiaka and Rodgers Lubilo

Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, a community-based natural resource and development programme has been promoted and implemented by the Namibian state and non-state agencies to simultaneously ensure ecological sustainability and socio-economic empowerment of people living in Namibia’s communal rural areas (Nuulimba & Taylor, 2015). The programme is globally known as Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). It entailed in Namibia the formation of conservancies on communal land, granting members of rural communities restricted usufruct rights over wildlife and other natural resources and to redistribute the benefits derived from such use among its registered members (Boudreaux & Nelson, 2011). Currently, there are 86 registered conservancies, covering 163,017 km², which is some 20% of Namibia’s territory inhabited by about 227,941 people (www.nacso.org.na). The expansion and operation of communal conservancies are positively associated with the increase in the numbers and diversity of wildlife. Ecotourism and trophy hunting provide the conservancies with monetary resources for cash payouts and other benefits for community development projects (Lapeyre, 2011). The conservancy programme is hence generally lauded in Namibia and beyond as successfully combining conservation (Naidoo et al., 2016a) with the socio-economic development of rural communities (Jones, Diggle, & Thouless, 2015). For this success to materialise, the management of the conservancies is expected to be participatory and democratic in nature (de Vette, Kashululu, & Hebinck, 2012; Lubilo, 2018; Bollig, 2016). The formation of conservancies assumed and implied that new institutional forms and modes of participating in decision-making and sharing of the monetary benefits of nature had to be designed and subsequently introduced in the communities (Ostrom, 1990). This occurred with substantial financial and technical support from international environmental organisations and donors.

We argue here that the formation of conservancies did not unfold as smoothly as planned. We demonstrate here that the conservancy model is contested and at the same time is being remodelled by those social actors who are in a position to exert their power and authority. We base our argument on field research
Navigating community conservancies

from two conservancies in Namibia: Khoadi Hôas and Wuparo in northwest and northeast Namibia respectively (see Figure 6.1). These are amongst the first communal conservancies to be registered in Namibia and are considered in Namibia by the Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) and Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) as well as by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to be successful and stable (Jones et al., 2015; Naidoo et al., 2016a). The data was collected at different times by the authors between 2016 and 2016; and 2013 and 2015. Data collection methods included participant observation, focus group discussions and key informant interviews with various members of the conservancies, including committee members, chairpersons and ordinary members. We also collected survey data and conducted a review of the available secondary data. Additionally we revisited the conservancies in 2018 and 2019 to observe the changes that had occurred after the fieldwork.

The chapter proceeds as follows: we first zoom in on the institutional complexities in which the communal conservancy programme became enmeshed and how the “modern” and “traditional” forms of organisations configure each other in and during the conservancy formation process. Secondly, we show that the conservancy has created spaces from which many will benefit; however, one does so more than the other. Conservancy actors thus manage to navigate the conservancy but each in their own ways, generating a variety of outcomes.

Theoretical framing

The CBNRM programme initiated in Namibia the formation of conservancies and conceived these as territory-based communities with legal status, governed by a constitution codifying the role of managers and that of elected committee members in the day-to-day management. This would democratically regulate the distribution of proceeds from nature such as trophy hunting and tourism to conservancy members. The formation process is triggered by a common-pool resource perspective that asserts that individuals sharing a resource can collectively participate in modifying the rules for resource management (Ostrom, 1990). Users are positioned as motivated by economic incentives to collaboratively and communally manage the (natural) resources sustainably. The premise is that one can design, modify and enforce rules that ensure conservation and regulate income distribution fairly and that the rights to the (natural) resources can be allocated to the people who reside on the land (Murphree, 2005; Saunders, 2014). The communal conservancy model often involves collaborations between private entrepreneurs, NGO’s and the state (Jones, 2010), which in the situations pertaining to nature conservation are incentivised by networks of global conservation-minded elites, global conservation NGOs, philanthropists and royalty and tourism entrepreneurs marketing nature for pleasure and profit (Van der Duim, Meyer, Saarinen, & Zellmer, 2012). Patches of communal land in Southern Africa have, as a result, been turned into commoditised conservation areas.
Figure 6.1 Situational map of Khoadi Hôas Conservancy
Considering that the boundaries of social institutions constituting a conservancy are pervious as a result of multiple ties and functions (Schnegg, 2018), the various social actors potentially (re)model the formation and daily management of the conservancies (Bollig, 2016; Kiaka, 2018; Lubilo, 2018). Some of these operate from “outside” the conservancy (e.g. policy makers, NGOs, labour migrants residing in Windhoek or elsewhere, tourists and hunters, lodge owners and trophy-hunting organisations) and those who work and live in the conservancy (e.g. ordinary members, chiefs and village headmen, managers, game guards). They wield asymmetrical powers and their authority shifts in and during the conservancy formation process. In considering their roles and relative influence, we need to take into account that conservancy formation processes carry elements of one or another form of controlling or disciplining (de Vette et al., 2012; Lubilo & Hebinck, 2019). Becoming registered as a conservancy entails following certain procedures, for example, the formulation of a constitution which is facilitated through training offered by NGOs and consultants, drafting of management and land-use plans and holding democratic elections to appoint committees and managers. These are rituals which have become part of the efforts to transform people into beneficiaries of development interventions (Mosse, 2005; de Vette et al., 2012) and to make them stakeholders in global conservation efforts with a local reach. The emphasis on designing and participation has unintentionally built upon pre-existing power structures, reinforcing these to the advantage of the “new” and “old” elites who hold various but differentiated positions of economic and political power. The old elites consist of chiefs and village headmen who customarily play key roles in distributing land. They nowadays form part of the Traditional Authority (TA) that are represented in the Regional and Communal Land Boards. Namibia’s post-independence reforms in land, water and political administration reasserted the authority of chiefs and headmen in natural resource management.

The new elites are those in salaried positions and private businessmen. The new elites have gained in importance, particularly after Independence in 1990. Both types of elites managed well in internalising the conservancy discourse and speaking the conservancy management language. They are thus able to gain (or to maintain) privileged access to development resources. They also attach themselves to the various nodes of power and control over rights and access to land, water and other natural resources as well as benefits of tourism and trophy hunting. Platteau (2004) understands this as elite capture. Critics of CPR (Acheson, 2011; Saunders, 2014) similarly argue that designing common property management is underpinned by assumptions that ignore the complexities that are involved in what we frame here as “navigating conservancy politics and everyday life.” Cleaver (2012) coined the term institutional bricolage to describe a process where actors (bricoleurs) navigate and patch institutional arrangements together “from cultural resources available to them in response to changing conditions.”

Although the communal conservancy programme has been evaluated as successfully streamlining natural resource management in Namibia (Nelson &
Agrawal, 2008; Naidoo et al., 2016a; Nuulimba & Taylor, 2015), the reality is that conservation efforts have been parachuted into an existing socio-political field of institutional complexities. The institutionalisation of conservancies has empowered a range of new actors, generating, in turn, a series of interfaces and contestations with the pre-existing so-called “traditional” modes and forms of organising the use and access to natural resources.

It is in this emerging and complex socio-political field that conservation efforts were inserted. Therefore, we suggest here to conceptualise conservancies as enmeshed with other forms and modes of power and authority, configuring and reconfiguring each other. We hypothesise, however, that those in positions of power and authority are not the sole beneficiaries of conservancies and that the conservancy provides a space or a room for manoeuvre for the actors to navigate. Building on the work of Long (2001), we conceptualise a conservancy as an emergent “arena.” Long (2001, p. 59) defines arena as “social locations or situations where issues, resources, values and representations contest with each other.” These arenas unfold either as spaces in which contestations and struggles associated with different practices and values of different domains take place or as spaces within a single domain where attempts are made to resolve discrepancies in value interpretation and incompatibility between the various actors’ interests. Moreover, where there exist different interests and values entangled with power imbalances, institutional complexities lead to micro-politics that may manifest in protracted contestations and conflicts over a resource (Saunders, 2014). This happens as the actors involved make use of the ambiguities and contradictions to navigate the complexities and carve out spaces to pursue their own ecological, social, economic and political interests.

Conservancy formation history: the case of ǃKhoadi Ḩôas and Wuparo

ǃKhoadi Ḩôas

The formation of ǃKhoadi Ḩôas Conservancy is well described in Kiaka (2018). Established in 1998 as a conservancy, in what was known as the Grootberg ward, ǃKhoadi Ḩôas has a population of about 4,300 inhabitants and occupies 3,366 km² of land (see Figure 6.1). Conservation NGOs consider ǃKhoadi Ḩôas as a success story and it serves as a model for CBNRM in Namibia because it currently rarely relies on donor funding. The Conservancy is well known for being the first to construct and renovate two fully community-owned tourist lodges for which it received a Community Benefit Award at the prestigious World Travel and Tourism Council’s “Tourism for Tomorrow.” Moreover, since 1999, ǃKhoadi Ḩôas has been a stable player in Namibia’s trophy hunting industry and creates employment and cash income for the local community.

The conservancy did not unfold in an institutional vacuum. In the late 1990s, the Grootberg Farmers Union focused on rangeland management and
livestock breeding improvement and marketing. The union wielded power from local farmers and became an instrument for mobilising local support for the conservancy programme. Its officials formed the founding committee of the conservancy. Furthermore, as part of the black empowerment policy of post-independence Namibia, more local people were employed and posted as extension workers, teachers and administrators in the Grootberg area. Some of these government workers were asked by their seniors in Windhoek to work with the conservancy programme team and ensure the conservancy was established. Some of them became part of the conservancy management committee or became employees.

The |Gaiodaman TA is in charge of local land administration and allocation of grazing rights. Both land and grazing rights give people residency and allow them the use of communal water points. However, the manner in which water is pumped into a communal reservoir and made available for communities is controlled by community water point committees. These water institutional arrangements have existed since early 2000 as part of a donor- and state-driven rural water decentralisation policy (Kiaka, 2018). The common usage of these resources is also shaped by informal social institutions that mediate everyday life. Although hunting is criminalised and monitored by the conservancy, kinship relations prevent people from reporting each other to the authorities (Kiaka, 2018). Trophy hunting and tourism increased, opening the area to capital investment mainly by international tour operators and hunting agencies. In 2014/2015, the conservancy earned about 54,000 US$ (824,040 Namibian dollars) from tourism and trophy hunting. The desire to control and benefit from these financial proceeds increases both local and external actors’ stake in wildlife conservancy affairs. Damages from wild animals in the area, especially elephants, have increased the need for compensation (Schnegg & Kiaka, 2018).

Wuparo

Established in 1999, Wuparo conservancy covers an area of 148 km². The conservancy is sparsely populated; residents live in several villages clustered throughout the area (see Figure 6.2). The formation of the conservancy was largely driven by NGOs such as IRDNC and the MET. They worked closely with the local chief and held a series of meetings to convince the local people that they would benefit from the conservancy programme. There are also reports that the formation was resisted by many people, especially the elders. They viewed the conservancy with suspicion, thinking that the government was planning to extend the Nkasa Ruparo National Park and that people would be displaced again, leading to the loss of their livelihoods.

Wuparo is situated in the floodplains, but over time a mosaic of woodlands and grasslands has emerged. Its abundant biodiversity and concentration of large and small mammals create an enabling environment for prime hunting and tourism; both activities contribute significantly to conservancy income. Its tourism potential has been increased as a result of the development of Nsaka...
Figure 6.2 Situational map Wuparo Conservancy
Navigating practices and processes within institutional complexities

This section builds on the idea that conservancies are rather differentiated in their capacity and ability to navigate the opportunities that a conservancy model represents. We make a distinction here between new elites, the representatives of the traditional authorities and the ordinary community members, the so-called commoners. We also single out the conservancy bureaucracy from the “new” elite category as they occupy positions that enable them to directly forge decisions.

Elite capture and elite control

In the formation and development of Khoadi Hôas conservancy, MET and NGOs were significantly assisted by new local elites who worked for the government as extension workers and teachers in the area. Because of their ability to communicate complex policy information to the communities, they were seen as change agents. In some cases, senior MET officials in the capital directly instructed the extension workers to teach the communities about CBNRM policies and principles and to mobilise them to support the conservancy idea. Translating CBNRM policy into practice was added to their job responsibilities. Their social status of being educated, holding government jobs and regular income accorded them community respect and qualified them as local people who are capable of providing leadership. Consequently, they were elected to key positions in the Khoadi Hôas conservancy management committee. Some left their government positions to work for the conservancy in donor-funded positions.

In addition to their elitist advantage, the new elites have a strong political base from two populous urban settlements (Erwee and Anker) which host government offices and is where they live. Many people with an interest in the conservancy leadership, but from the more rural and less-populated settlements, complain that they are unable to unseat elites who reside in the two urban settlements characterised by a larger population. Therefore, the dominant presence of local elites in the Khoadi Hôas conservancy has persisted to date.

Being a member of the conservancy management committee means that one gets seating allowances and portions of game meat whenever they attend conservancy meetings. In addition, committee members are also responsible for the recruitment of conservancy staff and employees of its two lodges. These jobs are highly sought after in an area where people live precarious lives characterised by meagre incomes from menial jobs, widespread hunger and inadequate
supply of other basic household needs. Employment opportunities, in particular, raise stakes and breed conflicts between conservancy members and officials. Many residents of the conservancy fault the recruitment process of the conservancy and mention situations where the intervention of key conservancy officials may have influenced the employment of their relatives in the conservancy or its tourism ventures. Indeed, the local elites of 𝐾𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖 𝐻óas have played an important role in controlling the conservancy formation and development process to its current glory of organisational stability and income generation. But they have also captured its benefits because of their privileged positions.

The MET and IRDNC collaborated in Wuparo closely together with Chief Sifu of the Mayeni people and those close to the royal clan to establish the conservancy. The new elites who slowly emerged through the ranks of the conservancy quickly realised that no decision could be made without endorsement from either the local headman or chief. Decisions on who gets employed or elected became a preserve of these elites (Lubilo, 2018). Those in leadership positions or employment manoeuvred their close relatives and friends into favourable positions. When it came to employing staff at the Nkasa Lupara lodge, those in leadership changed the selection procedure from being appointed at a general meeting to an interview. This was commonly viewed as allowing a secret selection of close relatives and friends. The elites are eager to occupy leadership positions as this gives them access to allowances, training and other kinds of exposure, such as trips abroad, with long-term benefits. For example, a former conservancy manager has been employed by MET after being trained by the conservancy. However, after many years of trial and error, Wuparo embarked on a transformation process to improve participation, consultation and increase benefits. While this improved the communication between those in leadership and members, those occupying key positions used the process to maintain their leadership positions. For example, the chairman and manager kept alternating their positions to make sure they stayed long at the helm.

*Traditional authority (TA)*

The TA, through the local Mayeyi chief and his village headmen, plays an active role in the management and decision-making processes of the conservancy at Wuparo. They are customarily involved in land allocation and settling disputes. This is still quite common in the Zambesi region (Harring & Odendaal, 2012), whereas the role of chiefs in the 𝐾𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖 𝐻óas conservancy is less prominent and dominant. The conservancy opened new opportunities for the traditional authorities to extract levies or rent payments. The chief and village headmen at Wuparo receive an annual grant from the conservancy. They also receive other royalties, including meat. The conservancy committee worked from the start through the traditional authority structure to secure land and to enter into conservation-related arrangements. To strengthen this relationship, the conservancy committees have included the TAs in their decision-making process; they are also involved in selecting those who should be employed by
the conservancy. In addition, the conservancy annually allocates a budget for chiefs for their traditional ceremonies. The conservancy has divided itself into three major zones, and in each of these there is an Induna who participates in conservancy management. The chief has a representative in the committee, and sometimes the local indunas take part in meetings. The decisions that are made without the TA are deemed illegitimate. All meetings are held at the Khuta (the traditional court) and the Induna is allowed to give some comments at the beginning and end of the meeting. Sometimes this dual governance system collides with the democratic nature of how conservancy decisions are made. This situation is ambiguous for the management committee as members tend to have more trust in the TA than in the conservancy committee. The TA has, after all, a longer history than conservancies' structures, which are still relatively new.

**The commoners**

The ‘commoners’ is in itself a problematic category as it is heterogeneous in composition. They have in common though – hence commoners – that they do not or only marginally participate in conservancy politics. They are a necessary ingredient of a conservancy but do not fully share in the benefits. Most withdraw from the conservancy affairs (Schnegg & Kiaka, 2018), while others deviate from its rules by continuing to hunt (Lubilo & Hebinck, 2019).

For ǂKhoab ǂHàos, the outsider’s view considers it a sustainable conservancy and beneficial to its common members. Unfortunately, the glory of this label does not resonate with the commoners of the conservancy. Only 67 people out of a possible adult population of 2,100 are employed by the conservancy and its two lodges. Only those who are employed receive further training benefits. The majority hardly benefits from the conservancy, yet they carry the burden inflicted by elephant destroying communal water points. Many consider this as an unjust outcome of the conservancy process and withdraw from participating in conservancy affairs. They do not attend conservancy meetings, especially if those meetings do not lead to a redistribution of costs of conservation through just compensation. Generally, those who attend the meetings mostly do so because they appreciate the free meals provided by the conservancy. Moreover, in ǂKhoab ǂHàos, people rarely report incidences of hunting by members of their kin to the conservancy partly because they do not want to betray trust embedded in helpful kinship ties, but also as a way to sabotage the governing process of the conservancy, whose outcome they consider as unjust.

Wuparo Conservancy has a registered membership of about 2,600 members, of which about 50–60 are employed and receive payments from the conservancy. The conservancy has over the years seen a drop in people attending the bi-annual meetings because few benefits trickle down to the ordinary members. The inadequate flow of benefits to ordinary members has also manifested itself into members’ apathy towards the management of the conservancy. The hunting of game is quite substantial in the conservancy (Lubilo & Hebinck, 2019). Members voice their frustration and pressurise the management committee to
improve the (re)distribution of benefits. This does not mean that Wuparo is a failure. Some people have accessed jobs, human–wildlife conflicts have been reduced and wildlife management and utilisation have improved.

**The conservancy bureaucracy**

Although the glory accorded to ǃKhoadi ǀHôas does not resonate with the living conditions of its residents and members, the conservancy bureaucracy succeeds to deflect this reality through the creation of success stories. In a first example, after the launch of “State of the Communal Conservancy Report” in 2016, an article with pictures of an elderly woman appeared in a Namibian newspaper describing how communities, especially women, benefit from communal conservancies. The fact that the story was purported to be told by an elderly woman amplified the success of CBNRM in ǀKhoadi ǀHôas. In subsequent interviews, the woman starring in the success story vehemently contested its contents. She insisted that the photos were actually taken in 2014 and used in an earlier newspaper article after a team of conservationists, journalists and senior conservancy staff interviewed her about the challenges of human–wildlife conflicts.

In a second example, a newspaper article generously wrote about a senior employee of ǀKhoadi ǀHôas. “A leading woman in community conservation in Namibia” read the title of the article in the Namibian newspaper in 2015. Her rise as a manager of the conservancy was captured by retracing the roots of a young “farm girl” out of school and facing the gendered vulnerabilities in poor rural communities to the rise to leadership epitomising a classic case of women’s empowerment. Nevertheless, the article was silent on the many frustrations the “leading woman in conservation” has over low remuneration and failure to compensate farmers of the loss they incur from human–wildlife conflicts.

Wuparo conservancy, despite its many challenges in meeting the needs of the membership, is well managed. The conservancy has continued to distribute some cash and project benefits to its members. Wuparo annually generates about US$100,000 (some N$1.5 million) from trophy hunting. Part of this income is distributed to individual members as cash benefits. The figure sounds substantial, but when disaggregated amongst members and all other costs accounted for, it only amounts to an average of US$14 (i.e. N$192) per annum per adult. This is far below the US$300 that local elites such as teachers or conservancy staff earn as a monthly salary. Despite the meagre per capita amount, its aggregated value is captured in the conservancy reports as an outstanding success.

For example, based on this “success” the conservancy was granted a Millennium Challenge Account award which enabled it to enter into a joint-venture partnership to construct the Nkasa Lupala Lodge, which further opens the area to private tourism entrepreneurs. Success is further created around financing community projects, yet the projects are not so sustainable. Only one out of a total of nine community projects is still operational (Lubilo, 2018). In addition, the conservancy is reported to have supported the training of its staff and local
communities, yet only a few new elites are able to use their acquired skills to realise some financial benefits such as through employment.

Navigating conservancy politics and everyday life

The central argument that runs through the chapter is that a conservancy should not be treated as a homogenous entity or as a neutral socio-political space. This aspect and the complexities that arise from the conceptualisation of conservancy as a “contested space” is rather ignored in the CBNRM literature that merely emphasises the success of community-based conservation (Naidoo et al., 2016b; Naidoo, Weaver, De Longcamp, & Du Plessis, 2011a; Naidoo, Weaver, Stuart-Hill, & Tagg, 2011b; Angula et al., 2018). We concur with Blaikie (2006) in his ground-breaking critique of CBNRM, “[t]here are success stories too, although they are stories told by the initiating agencies themselves.” We add to this debate by stipulating the importance of issues and relations of power and how that is shaped by the design principles of the conservancy. We have demonstrated here that a conservancy has a designed institutional arrangement with its inbuilt nodes of power, affects and simultaneously is affected by institutional arrangements that draw from different, pre-existing positions of power and authority. The conservancy unfolds as an arena or a socio-political space that consists of an interconnected web of institutions, norms and values that mediate actors’ relations with each other concerning the resources that are key to their livelihoods. The so-called extra local actors who drove the designing and enforced its institutionalisation are looped into the same socio-political force field. They continue to expect as per the design that conservancies perform as a community in order to be labelled as success stories of conservation (i.e. reducing poverty and conserving natural resources through sustainable management).

We unpacked a conservancy as an arena where different actor groups navigate and manoeuvre to reap the benefits of community-based conservation. In this way, we do not ignore and simplify but problematise the existing socio-political inequalities of the society that now constitute a conservancy. We distinguished four different categories of conservancy actors: elites, the traditional authorities, the commoners and the conservancy bureaucracy. They each exercise their agency in their own way to navigate the conservancy. While doing so, they employ a variety of discursive means (i.e. adhering to as well as manipulating and contesting the conservation model) and create different versions of the success of the conservancy for their respective constituencies. The elites exhibit their mastery of the conservation discourse, but simultaneously their social status manoeuvres them into positions so that they can capture the benefits of the conservancy. Backed by post-independence political reforms that strengthened their “traditional” power and authority positions, chiefs and headmen managed to extend that into the conservancies, allowing them, in turn, to extract annual land rents and levies and influencing appointments of staff. The commoners only marginally benefit; their non-participation and withdrawal should be read...
as a political weapon to contest the unequal distribution of benefits. They found alternative avenues to navigate everyday life in the conservancy. The conservancy bureaucracy, on the other hand, deflects local realities by communicating success stories which are palatable to national and international support for community-based conservation.

The conservancy remains an arena in which the conservancy actors navigate in various ways with various discursive means. Under such conditions, serious initiatives need to be taken to redesign the conservancy model, for instance, by taking everyday life as a starting point.

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Navigating community conservancies

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